Java4Shell (CVE-2026-114938): Pre-Auth Heap Overflow in OpenJDK’s Base64 Decoder

Java4Shell CVE-2026-114938 cover. A row of memory blocks where one block overflows into its neighbor, with the Phoenix Security logo.

Last updated: November 18, 2026. Fixed builds from some vendors are still rolling out. We will update this page as they land.

Executive Summary

Java4Shell (CVE-2026-114938) is a heap out-of-bounds write in OpenJDK’s hardware-accelerated Base64 decoder. Oracle scores it 8.1 under CVSS 3.1. Calif scores it 9.2 under CVSS 4.0.

It affects Java 17.0.6 and later, plus Java 21, 25 and 27. That covers every OpenJDK-based distribution: Oracle, Temurin, Corretto, Zulu, Microsoft, Liberica, SapMachine, Red Hat and Linux distro packages. Standard Java 8 and 11 are not affected. Oracle does list one Java 8 build as affected: its Enterprise Performance Pack build 8u511-perf.

Calif’s write-up changed the exploitation picture. The overflow writes mostly fixed bytes, so at first it looked close to unexploitable. Calif first turned it into a heap leak. The leak pulls Java heap contents such as tokens, keys and personal data, in the style of Heartbleed. Then Calif turned it into code execution. It reports:

  • pre-auth RCE against default setups of Keycloak, Atlassian Jira and Confluence, JFrog Artifactory, Jenkins and PingFederate
  • post-auth RCE against Kafka, Solr, Elasticsearch, Gerrit and Spinnaker
  • a client-side variant, where a Java program that connects over TLS to a malicious server can be compromised

Those chains are private for now. The public proof of concept only shows the overflow. VulnCheck’s assessment still holds for anyone without Calif’s tooling. Crashing a JVM is trivial. Reliable code execution needs custom heap grooming for each application.

Hardware gates exposure. The vulnerable code only runs on x86-64 CPUs with AVX-512 VBMI. That means Intel Xeon Ice Lake, Sapphire Rapids, Emerald Rapids and Granite Rapids, and AMD Zen 4 or newer. ARM servers are not affected.

Patch the products Calif named first. They sit on the internet, run Java 17 or 21, and hold credentials for everything downstream.

TL;DR for Engineering Teams

What it is: CVE-2026-114938 (Java4Shell), a heap out-of-bounds write in the AVX-512 Base64 decode intrinsic. CVSS 3.1 8.1 (Oracle), CVSS 4.0 9.2 (Calif).

Where it bites: OpenJDK-based Java 17.0.6+, 21, 25 and 27 on x86-64 CPUs with AVX-512 VBMI (Ice Lake through Granite Rapids, AMD Zen 4+). Oracle 8u511-perf too. ARM is not affected.

Why it matters: Calif reports pre-auth RCE in default Keycloak, Jira, Confluence, Artifactory, Jenkins and PingFederate. It also reports a JavaBleed heap leak and a client-side TLS variant. The exploits are withheld, and the public PoC only triggers the overflow. Anyone can crash a JVM. Not exploited in the wild as of November 18.

Patch status: Oracle fixed builds are out (17.0.21.1, 21.0.13.1, 25.0.5.1, 27.0.1.1). Amazon Corretto 17.0.21.1.2 and Amazon Linux packages are out. Temurin had no fixed build as of November 18. Zulu, Microsoft, Liberica, Red Hat and distro builds are rolling out. Check each vendor.

Immediate action: Patch, starting with the named products. Can’t patch? Use -XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsics (put -XX:+UnlockDiagnosticVMOptions in front if your build needs it). Or use -XX:UseAVX=2, on x86-64 hosts only. Then restart.

Vulnerability Overview

FieldValue
VendorOpenJDK Vulnerability Group / Oracle (and all OpenJDK distributors)
ProductOpenJDK / Java SE 17, 21, 25, 27 (HotSpot JVM)
Vulnerability TypeHeap out-of-bounds write (memory corruption)
CWECWE-787 Out-of-bounds Write, via CWE-191 Integer Underflow (as described by researchers)
CVSS Score8.1 (CVSS 3.1, Oracle), 9.2 (CVSS 4.0, Calif)
CVECVE-2026-114938
Patch AvailableYes (Oracle, Corretto, Amazon Linux); other distributions rolling out
Active ExploitationNot known to be exploited in the wild; not in CISA KEV as of November 18

The two scores describe the same bug. CVSS 3.1 counts the AVX-512 VBMI requirement as high attack complexity, so it lands at 8.1. CVSS 4.0 moves it to Attack Requirements, so it lands at 9.2.

Technical Anatomy

Root cause

HotSpot swaps hot calls to Base64.Decoder.decodeBlock for a hand-written AVX-512 assembly stub. This happens once the C2 compiler compiles the caller. The stub was added in JDK 18 (JDK-8268276). It was backported to Java 17 in 17.0.6 (JDK-8296735). That’s why 17.0.5 is clean and 17.0.6 is not.

The stub builds a 64-bit store mask from the input and output lengths. Then it adjusts the mask for padding.

Take a malformed tail made mostly of padding. The output length comes out as zero. The stub then subtracts one for each =, so the length underflows to -1 or -2. The mask instruction treats any length of 64 or more as “write everything”. So the stub stores all 64 bytes of its vector register. That’s 62 bytes past the end of the output array on the Java heap.

Java then rejects the input with IllegalArgumentException. But the neighboring memory is already overwritten. Catching the exception does not help.

The overwrite is mostly fixed values. Only the first two bytes are attacker-influenced. The attacker controls where the write lands, not what it writes. Calif notes the trigger threshold is higher on Java 17 than on 21 and later.

Exploit path

  1. Entry point. Any attacker-controlled Base64 that reaches java.util.Base64 before authentication. Pre-auth paths confirmed in public reproduction: Basic auth in Spring Security, Tomcat and Jetty 12, and JWT decoding in the java-jwt library. Calif adds login flows and file uploads in Struts and Spring Boot sample apps, plus the named products in default setup.
  2. Vulnerability trigger. The decode call must already be JIT-compiled. In public tests this took roughly 10,000 decodes. An attacker can warm it up with valid requests. Nothing gets corrupted during warm-up. A malformed padded value then overflows the output array.
  3. Execution impact. Without heap shaping, the JVM crashes. With Calif’s technique, the attacker gets a heap leak first, then code execution.

How Calif turned a fixed-byte overflow into RCE

This is the part that changed the risk rating. We describe it at the level defenders need. We leave out the parameters that make it work.

StageWhat happensDefender takeaway
WarmValid Base64 requests until the JIT uses the vulnerable stubHigh-volume valid Base64 traffic to one endpoint can come before an attack
GroomTimed partial HTTP requests shape which objects sit next to the decode bufferExploits depend on streamed request bodies and low network jitter
TriggerA malformed padded value overflows into a neighboring array and enlarges its lengthThe malformed-token signature fires here
Disclose (“JavaBleed”)The enlarged array becomes a read primitive; heap contents come back in responsesTreat tokens, keys and PII in heap memory as exposed on a hit
RepairCorrupted objects are restored so the JVM keeps runningA successful attack may leave no crash behind
FinishApplication-specific action, up to code executionOne custom profile per product

Three things matter for defenders.

There is no universal exploit. Each product needs its own decoder route, heap profile and payload. That’s why Calif’s list goes product by product.

The attack is retryable. A misaligned attempt can crash the JVM, but often the attacker just tries again. Crash bursts are a signal.

It is cheap. Calif says its researcher found the bug with an AI coding agent in about an hour. The first working exploit took two more hours and under $200 in tokens. AI agents built most of the later product chains. Expect independent exploits once people have read the patch diff and the write-up.

Exploitation status

ItemStatusSource
Overflow reproducedConfirmed on real hardwareVulnCheck, independent researchers, Calif
Pre-auth DoSTrivial where the decode path is reachableVulnCheck
Heap disclosure (JavaBleed)Technique published; leak reproduced in lab conditionsCalif, independent researchers
Pre-auth RCEClaimed in default Keycloak, Jira, Confluence, Artifactory, Jenkins, PingFederateCalif claim, exploits withheld
Post-auth RCEClaimed in Kafka broker, Solr, Elasticsearch, Gerrit, SpinnakerCalif claim
Client-side RCEClaimed via TLS connection to a malicious serverCalif claim (credited to samczsun)
Public PoCBounded trigger only; shows the overflow safelyCalif
Commercial exploitAvailable to VulnCheck Initial Access Intelligence customersVulnCheck
In-the-wild exploitationNone knownVulnCheck, CISA
CISA KEVNot listed as of November 18CISA

We are not reproducing the trigger string, trigger lengths, heap parameters or the proof of concept. Detection and mitigation do not depend on them.

Affected Versions

PackageVulnerable VersionsFixed VersionNotes
Oracle Java SE 1717.0.6 to 17.0.2117.0.21.1Oracle November 17 CSPU
Oracle Java SE 21through 21.0.1321.0.13.1
Oracle Java SE 25through 25.0.525.0.5.1
Oracle Java SE 27through 27.0.127.0.1.1
Oracle Java SE 8 Enterprise Performance Pack8u511-perf (8u511b33-perf)8u513-perfStandard Java 8 not affected
Oracle GraalVM for JDK17.0.21, 21.0.13Per Oracle advisoryCheck vendor
Amazon Corretto 1717.0.6+17.0.21.1.2Amazon Linux packages also out. Corretto 21/25: check vendor
Eclipse Temurin17.0.6+, 21, 25 (17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5 confirmed vulnerable)Not released as of November 18Check vendor
Azul Zulu, Microsoft Build of OpenJDK, BellSoft Liberica, SAP SapMachine, Red Hat build of OpenJDK17.0.6+, 21, 25, 27Per vendor advisoryVersion labels differ from Oracle’s. Check vendor
Distro openjdk-17 / -21 / -25 packagesSame rangesPer distro trackerCheck vendor
OpenJDK 8, 11, 17.0.0 to 17.0.5Not affectedn/aNo AVX-512 decode stub

The upstream fix ships in builds that carry JDK-8393212. A build whose number matches a “fixed” column can still run vulnerable code if it was built from a tree without that commit. If you build OpenJDK from source, check the commit, not the version string.

Exposure Analysis

EnvironmentRisk LevelReason
Keycloak, PingFederate (identity)CriticalCalif claims pre-auth RCE in default config. IdP compromise means account takeover everywhere downstream
Jira, Confluence, Jenkins, Artifactory (dev and collaboration)CriticalCalif claims pre-auth RCE in default config. They hold source, secrets, build and artifact supply chain
Other internet-facing Java with Basic auth, java-jwt, or Base64 uploadsCriticalConfirmed pre-auth paths. Trivial DoS. Custom RCE feasible
Kafka brokers, Solr, Elasticsearch, Gerrit, SpinnakerHighCalif claims post-auth RCE. Reachable by any authenticated or internal user
Outbound Java clients (CI agents, crawlers, webhook senders, integrations)HighCalif’s client-side variant: connecting over TLS to a malicious server is enough
Internal Java services on affected hardwareMediumRequires a foothold or internal reach
ARM64 (Graviton, Ampere), older Intel (Cascade Lake and earlier), pre-Zen 4 AMDNot affectedNo AVX-512 VBMI

Calif’s hardware check: the CPU must report all four flags, avx512f, avx512bw, avx512vbmi and bmi2. Intel Xeon Ice Lake, Sapphire Rapids, Emerald Rapids and Granite Rapids qualify. So do AMD EPYC and Ryzen on Zen 4 or newer.

Hardware decides most of the triage. On AWS, the affected families include c6i, m6i, c7i, c7a and m7a. On-prem, Ice Lake and Sapphire Rapids Xeons and EPYC Genoa and Turin are in scope. Graviton fleets are out.

There is still no honest internet-wide count. JVM builds and CPU features are not visible from the network.

Real-World Impact

Realistic scenarios, in order of likelihood:

  1. Pre-auth denial of service. Malformed Authorization headers against a Basic-auth or java-jwt endpoint crash or destabilize the JVM. Low skill, available now.
  2. Heap disclosure. A capable attacker uses the JavaBleed stage alone. It pulls tokens, session secrets or private keys out of an IdP or CI server without running any code. That’s data theft with no crash, and maybe no log line beyond the malformed request.
  3. Targeted pre-auth RCE on named products. Calif has working chains for Keycloak, Jira, Confluence, Artifactory, Jenkins and PingFederate. Its own numbers (an hour to find, three hours to a first exploit, under $200) say others will follow. A Keycloak or PingFederate compromise means account takeover across every app it fronts. Jenkins or Artifactory gives a foothold in the software supply chain.
  4. Client-side compromise. A Java process that connects over TLS to an attacker-controlled server can be hit. That pulls build agents, scrapers and outbound integrations into scope, even when they expose no port.
  5. Fake PoCs. Leaked bugs attract malicious “exploits”. Treat any downloadable Java4Shell tool as hostile.

Calif lists real limits. Some grooming profiles need streamed request bodies. A reverse proxy that buffers the full body (nginx does by default) breaks those chains, but not all of them. Calif’s Elasticsearch chain uses a single complete request, and WebSocket traffic bypasses body buffering. The attack is also sensitive to network latency and jitter. Calif ran its attacks from a VM in the target’s cloud region. Treat these as speed bumps, not mitigations.

Detection Guidance

Log and network indicators

  1. Request shape: a Base64-alphabet token of 32 characters or more, ending in =, whose length is not a multiple of 4. Valid padded Base64 always is, so false positives are low. Start with Authorization headers.
  2. Application logs: IllegalArgumentException: Input byte array has wrong 4-byte ending unit. It fired on every attempt in public reproduction tests.
  3. JVM crashes: SIGSEGV with hs_err_pid*.log, and bursts of worker or container restarts (exit 134). A crash is possible but not reliable, so pair it with the request signal.
  4. Post-exploitation: shells or network tools spawned by java, and unexpected outbound connections from Java service accounts.
  5. JWT anomaly: = padding inside JWT segments. JWTs use unpadded base64url.

VulnCheck ships Sigma, YARA, Snort and Suricata rules and PCAPs to its Initial Access Intelligence customers.

Scanner references

Phoenix Security SCA and container scanning find OpenJDK 17, 21, 25 and 27 runtimes in images and hosts. SBOM analysis (CycloneDX, SPDX) finds bundled JDKs. GitHub dependency scanning covers Dockerfile base images and toolchain files. External attack surface scanning finds exposed Jira, Confluence, Jenkins and Keycloak.

Verification steps for teams

  1. Find the running JVM: readlink -f /proc/<PID>/exe, then jcmd <PID> VM.version. In containers, check inside the workload, not on the host.
  2. Check the CPU: grep -o avx512vbmi /proc/cpuinfo | head -1. No output means the vulnerable path cannot run.
  3. Check whether a mitigation flag is live: java -XX:+PrintFlagsFinal -version | grep -E 'UseAVX|UseBASE64Intrinsics'.
  4. Map each affected runtime to its exposure. Internet-facing services with Basic auth or java-jwt go first.
  5. Review SBOMs and vendor appliances for bundled JDKs.

Remediation Guidance

Immediate actions

  1. Patch. Oracle JDK to 17.0.21.1, 21.0.13.1, 25.0.5.1 or 27.0.1.1. Corretto 17 to 17.0.21.1.2. For every other distribution, take the fixed build from that vendor’s advisory and the OpenJDK advisory.
  2. Restart and verify the running build with jcmd. A patched package on disk does nothing until the JVM restarts.
  3. Rebuild images on fixed base tags and pin by digest.
  4. Prioritize AVX-512 VBMI hosts running Calif’s named products. Keycloak, PingFederate, Jira, Confluence, Jenkins and Artifactory go first. Kafka, Solr, Elasticsearch, Gerrit and Spinnaker go next.
  5. Rotate secrets held in the memory of any affected internet-facing JVM that showed crashes or malformed-token hits since November 16. The JavaBleed stage can leak them without code execution.

CISA’s alert asks for the same order of work: inventory JDKs, patch, and use compensating controls where you can’t patch yet.

Temporary mitigations

MitigationEffectTrade-off
-XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsics (VulnCheck’s form adds -XX:+UnlockDiagnosticVMOptions first; harmless either way)Portable Java decoder; stops the overflow (Calif; VulnCheck on 17, 21, 25; independent tests on all versions tested)Slower Base64 decoding
-XX:UseAVX=2Removes AVX-512 code paths entirely; also stops the overflowWider performance cost. x86-64 only: an ARM JVM does not recognize the flag and fails to start (Calif)
Reverse proxy buffers full request bodiesBreaks Calif’s streamed-request grooming for some productsDoes not stop single-request chains (Elasticsearch) or WebSocket paths. Not a fix
Edge rule on the request shape aboveBlocks malformed padded tokens in auth headersPartial. Covers only the headers you inspect

Set the flag in JAVA_TOOL_OPTIONS or on the java command line, then restart. No rebuild needed.

Do not push -XX:UseAVX=2 to a mixed x86/ARM fleet through a shared JAVA_TOOL_OPTIONS. The ARM JVMs will not start.

Two pieces of circulating advice are wrong. -XX:DisableIntrinsic=_base64_decodeBlock without -XX:+UnlockDiagnosticVMOptions stops the JVM from starting. Pushed fleet-wide, that’s an outage. And “fixed in 17.0.11 and 21.0.3” refers to JDK-8321599, an older data-loss bug in the same decoder.

Phoenix Security Recommendations

Java4Shell is a runtime CVE gated by hardware. A flat CVE list flags every Java 17+ container and host. It buries the ones that matter: AVX-512 VBMI hosts serving pre-auth Base64 to the internet.

Phoenix Security collapses the duplicates through contextual deduplication. One OpenJDK runtime seen by container scanning, SBOM ingestion and host agents becomes one finding.

Reachability analysis ranks internet-facing services with Basic auth or java-jwt above batch jobs on Graviton. Attack surface management finds exposed Jira, Confluence, Jenkins and Keycloak.

The Java4Shell remediation campaign targets OpenJDK 17, 21, 25 and 27 runtimes. It routes each one to its owner through ownership attribution. It tracks the fix until the running build moves, not just the package.

Phoenix Security correlates vulnerable runtimes with live workloads, finds exposed services through attack surface management, and assigns remediation ownership. A fleet-wide JVM problem becomes an owned, trackable backlog.

See the Java4Shell campaign on your own estate. Book a demo.

References

  1. OpenJDK Vulnerability Advisory for CVE-2026-114938, November 17, 2026
  2. Oracle Critical Security Patch Update, November 2026
  3. CVE-2026-114938 record on CVE.org
  4. CISA alert: critical Java vulnerability requires immediate patching, November 17, 2026
  5. CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
  6. Calif technical write-up: Java4Shell, by Quang Luong
  7. Calif disclosure statement on X
  8. VulnCheck analysis of Java4Shell
  9. Cardano Foundation defensive workaround, cardano-rosetta-java PR #900
  10. OpenJDK history of the decoder: JDK-8268276, the original AVX-512 Base64 optimization, JDK-8296735, the Java 17 backport, and JDK-8321599, the earlier data-loss bug in the same decoder
Marcus has spent two decades working at the intersection of cybersecurity, cloud infrastructure and enterprise risk. With senior leadership experience at IBM, Accenture and several high-growth security startups, he brings deep expertise in helping organisations navigate complex threat landscapes. Marcus is a trusted advisor to CISOs and security leaders across North America and EMEA.

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Java4Shell (CVE-2026-114938) is a heap overflow in OpenJDK’s AVX-512 Base64 decoder, affecting Java 17.0.6 through 27. Calif claims pre-auth RCE in default Keycloak, Jira, Confluence, Jenkins, Artifactory and PingFederate, plus a heap leak. Hardware decides exposure: only x86 servers with AVX-512 VBMI run the vulnerable code.
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